History and Philosophy of Science 122:
Probability, Evidence, and Belief
Fall, 2012
Professor Joel Velasco
Class meets Tuesdays and Thursdays, 2:30-3:55 in BBB 3
Course syllabus
Description:
This course will examine a few aspects of the relationship between Probability and Epistemology. In doing so, we will look at the foundations of probability theory, interpretations of probability, arguments for and against probabilism (the view that we ought to have degrees of belief that are probabilities), conditionalization, and Bayesian confirmation theory.
Requirements:
Attendance in class and participation in discussion are required and will affect your grade. There will be two shorter assignments worth 30% and 30% and one longer final paper worth 40% of your final grade.
Office hours:
My office hours are Mon 11:00-12:00 and Thur 4:00-5:00, or by appointment, in 13 Dabney Hall.
Books and readings:
There are no assigned textbooks for this class. All assigned readings (and many extra readings) will be made available on this website.
This is a tentative schedule/reading list:
Week 1 (10/2, 4) - Introduction to the course/probability theory
- Required Reading
- Extra Reading
Week 2 (10/9, 11) - Interpretations of Probability I
- Required Readings
- Extra Readings
Week 3 (10/16, 18) - Interpreting Probabilities II - Subjective Degrees of Belief
- Required Reading
- Extra Reading
- Skyrms, Coherence (chapter from Choice and Chance).
- Ramsey, Truth and Probability (the earliest dutch book argument and representation theorem)
- Kemeny, Fair Bets and Inductive Probabilities (proves the converse dutch book theorem)
- Hájek, Dutch Book Arguments
- Vineberg, The Notion of Consistency for Partial Beliefs
- Armendt, Dutch Books, Additivity, and Utility Theory
- Schick, Dutch Bookies and Money Pumps
- Weatherson, Begging the Question and Bayesianism
- Hájek, Scotching Dutch Books
Week 4 (10/23, 25) - Diachronic Rationality
- Required Readings
- Extra Readings
Week 5 (10/30, 11/1) - What are Degrees of Belief
- Required Readings
- Extra Readings
Week 6 (11/6, 8) - Scoring Rule Arguments for Probabilism
- Required Reading
- Extra Reading
- Pettigrew, Epistemic Utility arguments for Probabilism (from Stanford Encyclopedia)
- Maher, Joyce's Arguments for Probabilism
- Seidenfeld, Calibration, Coherence, and Scoring Rules
- Joyce, Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief
- Arntzenius, Swanson, and Gibbard, Replies to Gibbard and his response
- Hájek, Arguments for-or against-Probabilism
- Leitgeb and Pettigrew, An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy
- Leitgeb and Pettigrew, An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy
- Fitelson, Accuracy, Language Dependence and Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism
- Easwaran and Fitelson, An “Evidentialist” Worry About Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism
Week 7 (11/13 [no class on Thursday, 11/15]) - Bayesian Confirmation Theory
- Required Readings
- Sober, Evidence and Evolution (sections 1.1 through 1.4)
- Extra Readings
- Strevens, Bayesian Confirmation Theory
- Sober, An Introduction to Bayesian Epistemology (if you see funny symbols try downloading it and opening in adobe rather than online)
- Eagle, Introduction to Evidence and Probability: Bayesian Confirmation Theory from Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings
- Howson and Urbach, Bayesian vs. Non-Bayesian Approaches to Confirmation (originally from Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach)
- Sober, Bayesianism, its Scope and Limits
- Sober, Epistemology for Empiricists
- Earman & Salmon, The Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses (parts 1 + 4), Chapter 2 of Introduction to the Philosophy of Science
- Maher, Confirmation Theory
***Second homework assignment - Due 11-15***
Week 8 (11/20 [no class on Thursday, 11/22]) - The Problem of Old Evidence
- Required Readings
- Extra Readings
Week 9 (11/27, 29) - Measuring Confirmation
- Required Readings
- Extra Readings
Week 10 (12/4, 6) - Applied Problems
- Required Readings
- Extra Readings