Back to required readings:
On Representation Theorems
- Pettigrew, Epistemic Utility arguments for Probabilism (from Stanford Encyclopedia)
- Joyce, A Non-Pragmatic Vindication of Probabilism
- Maher, Joyce's Arguments for Probabilism
- Seidenfeld, Calibration, Coherence, and Scoring Rules
- Joyce, Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief
- Gibbard, Rational Credence and the Value of Truth
- Arntzenius, Swanson, and Gibbard, Replies to Gibbard and his response
- Hájek, Arguments for-or against-Probabilism
- Leitgeb and Pettigrew, An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy
- Leitgeb and Pettigrew, An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy
- Fitelson, Accuracy, Language Dependence and Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism
- Easwaran and Fitelson, An “Evidentialist” Worry About Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism